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Introduction and Background 
of the Reemployment 
Bonus Experiments
Walter A. Corson and Robert G. Spiegelman
MOTIVATION FOR A BONUS OFFER PROGRAM: 
WORK INCENTIVES IN THE UNEMPLOYMENT 
INSURANCE SYSTEM
In the 1980s, the federal government sponsored several field exper-
iments to evaluate alternative approaches to reducing voluntary unem-
ployment and improving the functioning of the unemployment
insurance (UI) system.  Four of these experiments involved the offer of
bonuses to encourage more rapid return to work by UI recipients.
Other experiments to enhance work search and to encourage self-
employment were also implemented.  Some of these experiments
emphasized the offer of “carrots” to encourage desired behavior, while
other proffered “sticks.”  These two approaches are described more
fully in later sections.
Theoretical and non-experimental empirical work had consistently
found that the availability of unemployment benefits led to voluntary
and unproductive reduction in work effort, thereby leading to unneces-
sarily high costs to the UI system.  The three experiments that we
describe in this study were designed to test whether offering bonuses to
UI claimants would reduce voluntary unemployment.  As we will
show, the bonus experiments were successful in reducing the length of
insured unemployment spells (see Chapter 4) and thus in reducing ben-
efit payment costs to the UI system.  They accomplished this reduction
without any observed adverse effect on the quality of jobs obtained
from job search (see Chapter 5), indicating that the bonus offer did not
reduce effective job search activities.   
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The majority of the 11 alternative programs tested in the experi-
ments, and all of the hypothetical programs using the combined data
from the three experiments, generated positive net benefits to society
(see Chapter 7).  This result reflects the low costs of administering a
bonus program, accompanied by the generally positive effects on
claimants’ earnings.  However, only a few of the designs provided net
benefits to government in general, or the UI system in particular,
because the costs of paying bonuses usually exceeded the UI payment
reductions.  As discussed in Chapter 7, however, if one sector benefits
from the program but other sectors do not, then the program can be
implemented by transferring funds from the winners to the losers.  For
instance, if society benefits but the UI system does not, an option is to
pay the bonuses out of general revenues. 
These experiments were conducted over a decade ago.  Why
should we still be interested in them?  The policy issue raised by the
experiments, though temporarily in abeyance, is not a dead issue.  The
possibility of using bonuses or similar mechanisms (such as wage sup-
plements) to encourage more active job search is still one under con-
sideration.  The Reemployment Act of 1994 (submitted by President
Clinton, but not enacted by Congress) emphasized “UI flexibility” as
an integral part of employment and training policy.  The concept was
that a series of interventions would include short-term compensation,
reemployment services, self-employment assistance, and reemploy-
ment bonuses.  The intent of the act was to turn the UI program toward
reemployment assistance.  When the Workforce Investment Act was
passed by Congress five years later, the emphasis on UI flexibility was
gone, but when the concept is again of political interest at some future
time, consideration of bonuses can be expected to return. 
This book also contains several features not often found in social
policy research: 1) multiple experiments with very similar designs,
enabling the comparison of results of experiments conducted in differ-
ent locations and different social contexts; and 2) the transference from
experiment to policy by considering impacts on nonparticipants and
through explicit benefit-cost analysis.  
The remainder of this chapter discusses the motivation for the
experiments in more detail and their theoretical and historical under-
pinnings.  An overview of the book is presented in the final section of
this chapter.
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THE UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE SYSTEM
As part of the Social Security Act of 1935, a national UI system
was introduced to the country for the first time.  After slowly building
in the late 1930s and through the war period, the UI system reached its
stride near the end of the 1940s, after the conversion from a wartime to
a peacetime economy had taken place.  By 1948, almost three-quarters
of the unemployed were covered by UI, and total benefit outlays in that
year were just under $800 million.  By 1992, although benefit outlays
had grown to $23 billion, coverage had declined to about one-third of
the unemployed.  In the remainder of the 1990s, outlays declined to
about $20 billion per year, or even less, and coverage remained about
one-third of the unemployed.1
As in any insurance program, UI has a mechanism to fund future
obligations, a mechanism to determine entitlement, and a procedure for
making payments.  Administrative costs are mostly covered by the fed-
eral government, while benefit payments are made out of a trust fund,
which is administered by the U.S. Treasury but funded through taxes
on employers.  Each state has an independently administered trust
fund.  If payments exceed the funds available in the trust, the state must
borrow from the Treasury and repay with interest.  Total state reserves
were a comfortable $8 billion in 1948, representing 8 percent of total
payroll.  Reserves rose to $38 billion in 1990 but represented less than
2 percent of payrolls in that relatively prosperous year.  After falling to
$26 billion in 1992, reserves recovered to $48 billion in 1998, but that
represented only 1.5 percent of payroll.2  In 1948, the average
employer paid UI taxes amounting to 1.2 percent of taxable wages.  By
1992, that percentage had increased to 2.2 percent, about where it has
remained to date.   Interestingly, however, because of declining cover-
age, benefit outlays were 0.8 percent of taxable wages in 1948 and only
slightly higher in 1992.  By 1998, that percent had declined to only 0.6
percent.  For detailed discussions of UI financing, see Vroman (1990)
and Blaustein (1993).
A worker who is in a firm covered by the UI system and becomes
unemployed because of lack of work (not because of voluntarily quit-
ting, or being fired for committing acts detrimental to the employer) is
entitled to receive unemployment compensation.  Entitlement to com-
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pensation, however, is conditional on the worker having sufficient earn-
ings in the base period, usually the first four of the last five calendar
quarters prior to filing for benefits.  The dollar value of benefits payable
in a week in which the UI beneficiary is fully unemployed is usually 50
percent of previous weekly wages, subject to a minimum and a maxi-
mum.  Because of minimums and maximums, on the average, UI recip-
ients receive about 40 percent of previous weekly earnings.  The
beneficiary is entitled to these payments for a certain number of weeks
during the year after filing for benefits (called the benefit year).  Twelve
states (including Illinois) pay benefits for a fixed number of unem-
ployed weeks, typically either 26 or 30.  However, most states (includ-
ing Washington and Pennsylvania) pay benefits for a variable number
of weeks, depending upon the claimant’s work history.  A beneficiary is
said to have “exhausted benefits” if the beneficiary remains unem-
ployed after having received all the benefits to which he or she is enti-
tled for the benefit year.  In some recession years, when unemployment
has remained high, the federal government has financed extended ben-
efit programs and benefits have been provided for up to 52 weeks.  
From the start, however, there has been some ambiguity as to
whether the system is primarily designed to “alleviate the hardships
that result from the loss of wage income during unemployment”
(Blaustein 1993, p. 43) or “to insure workers against the risks of earn-
ings loss from unemployment” (Burtless 1990, p. 75).  The system
today contains elements of both.  For instance, the replacement rates
are higher for low-wage workers.  On the other hand, the insurance
concept prevails in the requirement that the claimant must be involun-
tarily unemployed to collect benefits.  No one collects fire insurance
for burning down their own house; life insurance is not usually paid in
cases of known suicide.  Thus, the insurance principle is violated if the
insurance is paid for strictly voluntary periods of unemployment.  This
principle drove the requirements that unemployment beneficiaries be
“able and available” for work and be actively seeking employment.
Furthermore, benefits cease to be paid if the beneficiary refuses the
offer of “suitable” work.  That the work must be “suitable” implies that
simply minimizing the period of unemployment by requiring beneficia-
ries to take any job is not an objective of the program.  Extending the
search to find suitable work is acceptable and even encouraged—
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through, for instance, the requirements that the Employment Service
(ES) assist the beneficiary to find suitable work.  
Legislation in the second half of the 1990s has dramatically
changed the nature and functioning of the UI system.  The emphasis
overwhelmingly has become the return to work.  This emphasis, how-
ever, has been coupled with a vast simplification in the handling of
claims to reduce administrative costs, a process that may not be totally
compatible with the back-to-work goal.  Changes in the UI system are
foreshadowed in the reform of the nation’s welfare system.  The Per-
sonal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act
(PRWORA) established a system of bloc grants from the federal gov-
ernment to the states, with the fundamental requirement that states
have most recipients working within two years of first receiving assis-
tance benefits.  Today, all but four states have what is called work-
based welfare as their modus operandi.
The Workforce Investment Act (WIA) signed into law in 1998
includes many of the characteristics of the PRWORA for the UI sys-
tem.  The emphasis is on speedy reemployment, with training provided
only if necessary to obtain employment; the philosophy is that the best
training is a job.  The new federal system under WIA provides reem-
ployment services under one roof—including payment of UI benefits,
job placement, counseling, and job skill training—unless initial claims
are taken by telephone, in which case there is no UI office as such.  
Unemployment Insurance and the Duration of Unemployment
Starting in the early 1970s, Martin Feldstein, and then others,
argued that UI has contributed to increased unemployment by reducing
the incentive to become reemployed (see especially Feldstein 1973).
This problem can arise in any insurance scheme because of “moral
hazard,” whereby agents who are being insured against a state (e.g.,
unemployment) do not take all measures to avoid that state (Burtless
1990, pp. 78–79; Bailey 1977).  If a job seeker extends unemployment
in order to obtain a better job, society may be better off.  However, if
the additional unemployment is not used for effective job search, then
the additional unemployment may be considered voluntary and a net
cost to the system.
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It would be desirable to be able to determine the effect of UI on the
amount of voluntary unemployment and clearly distinguish it from the
involuntary kind.  But, as Burgess and Kingston (1990, p. 138) pointed
out, such a distinction is muddy.  There is an involuntary element in all
unemployment, in the sense that no one chooses bad luck over good;
there is also a voluntary element in all unemployment, in the sense that
however miserable one’s current work options, one could always
accept some job (p. 138).  Thus, in the end, the UI question is empiri-
cal—how much does UI increase unemployment and what is the result
of the increase in terms of job matches? 
A large body of research has estimated the effects of UI benefits on
the duration of unemployment.  Decker (1997) summarized estimates
of how the entitled duration of benefits and the rate of wage
replacement3 affect the length of joblessness.  The studies showed that
lengthening the entitled duration of benefits by 1 week lengthens job-
lessness by between 0.1 and 0.5 weeks, and a 10 percent increase in the
wage replacement rate is estimated to increase joblessness by between
0.3 and 1.5 weeks. 
However, these results might understate the effects on the popula-
tion of particular interest for the bonus experiments (i.e., those claim-
ants not expecting recall to their previous job).  The work by Topel and
Welch (1979) is informative on this issue.  Separating UI claimants on
temporary and permanent layoff, they found that UI effects on duration
were greater for the latter group.  A 10 percent rise in the benefit
replacement rate extended the average unemployment spell of insured
workers who change jobs by 1.2 weeks; the increase was much less for
those temporarily laid off.
A third group of studies measured the effects of UI compensation
on the wage rate of jobs accepted after receiving benefits.  Several stud-
ies found substantive effects of changes in the UI replacement rate,
especially on male wages, with smaller effects on female wages.4
Other researchers, however, have failed to find any earning effects (see
Classen 1979; Welch 1977).  Welch doubts there is one, because if all
unemployed are searching more, the wage can not be expected to rise
(Burtless 1990, pp. 96–97).  Overall, the evidence as to whether or not
there is an effect of UI on the reemployment wage rate is weak. 
As noted above, theory suggests, and the empirical work demon-
strates, that UI increases the duration of unemployment.  Both theory
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and empirical evidence, however, are imprecise in estimating the quan-
titative effects and are ambiguous as to the extent to which the addi-
tional unemployment leads to improved job matches.  Thus, the stage is
set to design and test programs with the goal of reducing voluntary
unemployment without adversely affecting the quality of job matches. 
Why a Bonus Offer Might Reduce Unemployment
The expectation that an offer of a bonus would lead to reduced
unemployment has theoretic roots in contemporary job-search theory,
which developed the concept of an optimal search strategy for unem-
ployed workers.5  McCall (1965) described an optimal search rule for
job seekers as involving a sequential process in which the worker
decides whether or not to continue searching after obtaining each wage
offer.  In this context, a bonus offer to find a job within a specified time
raises the cost of rejecting a given job offer, thereby reducing the reser-
vation wage and increasing the likelihood of accepting any particular
job offer (see Davidson 1990, pp. 15–17).  This theory, in conjunction
with job-matching theory, would hold that reducing the reservation
wage would not necessarily reduce the offered wage because the higher
reservation wage was unrealistic in terms of job offers available.  Thus,
the critical questions to be answered for a potential bonus offer pro-
gram are 1) will it reduce unemployment and 2) will the reduction
affect job matches?  
Before discussing the three bonus offer experiments that are the
main focus of this book, it is of value to briefly describe other experi-
mental approaches to unemployment reduction.  Experimental research
could take two alternative directions: 1) programs that increase the
requirements for job search and job acceptance and/or impose penalties
for failure to conduct active search (i.e., a “stick”), or 2) positive incen-
tives to increase the intensity of job search or more rapid acceptance of
job offers (i.e., a “carrot”).  The bonus offer is obviously of the latter
category. 
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THE “STICK”: UI WORK TEST REQUIREMENTS
Work Test Requirements and Their Implementation
State UI programs contain various work-test requirements to
ensure that UI benefits are paid only to claimants who show a continu-
ing attachment to the labor market.  In most states, the cornerstone of
these requirements is a set of provisions that require claimants to
search actively for work.  These requirements are integrated with work-
test rules pertaining to claimants’ ability to work, availability for work,
and refusal of suitable work.  By requiring active work search, these
rules are also intended to increase the level and intensity of search and
hence to promote rapid reemployment.  
Individual states have latitude in defining and applying work-
search rules according to their specific policy concerns, political cli-
mates, and economic conditions.  Consequently, work-search rules and
their application vary considerably among the states (Corson, Hershey,
and Kerachsky 1986).  Although a few states do not impose search
requirements, most do impose some work-search requirements on
claimants, exempting those with definite recall dates and those who use
union hiring halls to find jobs.  These search requirements typically
specify either the number of contacts to be made by claimants or a spe-
cific number of contacts according to the claimant’s occupation and
local labor-market conditions.  Most states with search requirements
ask claimants to list their job contacts on a biweekly claim form.
These forms are usually checked to determine whether job contacts are
filled in, but few states actually verify the contacts.  States that perform
verification tend to do so only for a sample of claimants. 
All states also expose claimants to job openings by requiring that
claimants register with the state Employment Service (ES).  However,
the degree to which states monitor compliance with ES registration
varies.  Some states require proof of registration before UI claims can
be completed, while others do no more than schedule a time for regis-
tration.  More recently, in states with initial claims processing by tele-
phone, ES registration is completed electronically.  Even when ES
registration was carefully monitored, fewer than half of the claimants
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who registered received job referrals or reemployment services from
the ES (Corson, Kerachsky, and Eliason-Kisker 1988).
Research by Burgess and Kingston (1987) indicated that many
claimants did not fully comply with their state’s work test rules, partic-
ularly those pertaining to active search.  In a five-state study, Burgess
and Kingston found that half of the dollars overpaid in each of the
states were due to work-search violations.  Fourteen percent of claim-
ants required to actively search for work failed to do so, and verifica-
tion procedures were unable to confirm 25 to 50 percent of the
employer contacts. 
Burgess and Kingston’s recommendation that computerized
screening profiles be used to target administrative resources on high-
risk claimants has been widely implemented.  Their recommendations
for increased penalties for noncompliance—presently, the main, if not
only, penalty is return of overpayments without added penalty—and
increased noncompliance detection have received much less support.  
In fact, the main result of these recommendations in the 1990s has
been a reduction in work-search requirements in order to reduce error
rates.  One major change in processing UI claims in the 1990s, which
many believe actually reduces the motivation of UI claimants to seek
work, is the adoption by most states of telephone processing of subse-
quent weekly claims.  Only the new initial claim is filed in person.
Other recent innovations center on the use of modern technology to
improve job search.  Automated job matching is starting up in Wash-
ington and other states.  However, it is not clear whether modern tech-
nology reduces or increases work-search accountability.  
The “Stick”: Recent Experimental Evidence
Alternative job search strategies were examined as part of experi-
ments in South Carolina, New Jersey, and Washington.6  Some of this
work was instrumental in the enactment by the federal government of
the Worker Profiling and Reemployment Services (WPRS) System in
1993.7
The two federally sponsored studies in Charleston, South Carolina,
and Tacoma, Washington, provided particularly strong evidence that
tightening work-search requirements can be effective in reducing
claimants’ duration on UI and promoting reemployment.8  Charleston’s
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Claimant Placement and Work Test Demonstration, conducted in 1983
(Corson, Long, and Nicholson 1985), made registration with the ES
mandatory for all treatment-assigned claimants who received a first UI
payment (except for those filing through mass layoff procedures).
Compliance with the registration requirement was carefully monitored
through a computer matching process, and claimants who failed to reg-
ister could no longer receive UI benefits until they could verify that
they were indeed available for work.  Claimants were assigned to one
of three treatment groups that represented three different levels of ser-
vice: 1) a basic placement interview, 2) a more intensive placement
interview with a second call-in for services, or 3) a more intensive
interview with a call-in for a short job-search workshop, as well as the
second placement interview.  A fourth group, the control group, was
not required to register with the ES.  
As expected, each of the treatments increased the use of the ES
among UI claimants.  The experimental treatments also reduced weeks
of UI benefits by 0.5 week for the group that received the basic call-in
and placement interview and 0.75 week for the group that received the
additional call-ins for the job-search workshop and second placement
interview.  Overall, the treatments were cost-effective, with net savings
in UI benefit payments (after deducting added administrative costs)
ranging from $46 to $56 per claimant.  No evidence was found, how-
ever, that the treatments increased employment or earnings.
The Washington Alternative Work Search Experiment was con-
ducted in Tacoma, Washington, in 1986 and 1987 (Johnson and Klepi-
nger 1991).  This demonstration, unlike the others, focused directly on
work-search requirements (as opposed to strengthening the link
between UI and the ES).  A control group was subjected to Washing-
ton’s standard work-search requirement that claimants make three
employer contacts per week.  Control group members were also
required to participate in both group and individual interviews to
review work-search and UI eligibility issues.  These sessions were held
about 13 to 15 weeks after the claimant filed the initial claim.  One
treatment enhanced this approach with a customized approach to work-
search requirements,9 and another treatment used a more intensive
approach that included a two-day job-search workshop.  A final treat-
ment—exception reporting—abandoned all work-search reporting
requirements.  This final treatment required only that claimants report
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when they became reemployed or changed their earnings; if no report
was made, a benefit payment was mailed to the claimant.  
The exception reporting approach was clearly a disaster; it led to
an increase in UI benefit payments of 3.3 weeks, on average.  No sig-
nificant differences in UI receipt were found for the customized
approach relative to the standard work-search policy of three contacts
per week, but a reduction of about 0.5 week in UI benefits was found
for the more intensive service approach (Johnson and Klepinger 1994).
Interestingly, a hazard rate analysis indicated that the impact of this
treatment appeared to occur at the point when claimants received the
letter telling them to come to the workshop, not at the end of the work-
shop.  This finding suggests that the effect was the result of the claim-
ants perceiving the workshop as a “cost” of receiving UI payments and
not as a benefit.
Not all experiments that tested increased work-search requirements
provided support for this approach.  In 1991, Ashenfelter, Ashmore,
and Deschênes (1999) evaluated an experiment conducted in four
states with two treatments.   In one treatment, the subject was exposed
to the so-called Benefits Rights Interview (BRI), wherein the claim-
ant’s responsibility to actively search for work is explained on the first
visit to the UI office.  The controls would receive the BRI on the sec-
ond visit, as would normally be the case.  In addition, the treatment
group received an expanded initial eligibility questionnaire.  For a sec-
ond treatment group, an additional aspect of the treatment involved an
actual verification that the claimant undertook job search.  There were
about 1,900 experimental subjects and the same number of controls in
four states: Connecticut, Tennessee, Massachusetts, and Virginia.  No
results in the individual states achieved a 95 percent confidence level.
In the pooled data, claimants in the overall treatment group did show a
5 percent decrease in the likelihood of qualifying for benefits in the
first week; however, there were no statistically significant effects on
benefit amounts or duration, once qualified.  The authors concluded
that the results of this experiment failed to confirm the benefits of
stricter work-search enforcement.  This finding may only apply to the
specific treatments tested, and does not necessarily contradict other
findings that stronger work-search requirements would be effective.  
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THE “CARROT”
Self-employment experiments fall into this category.  Two were
conducted in the UI systems of Massachusetts and Washington.  Benus,
Wood, and Grover (1994) summarized findings of these experiments.
The findings led to a temporary five-year authorization of self-employ-
ment assistance (SEA) being included in the North American Free
Trade Agreement (NFTA) Implementation Act.10  The Massachusetts
design was implemented, as it promised a neutral impact on the Unem-
ployment Trust Fund.  SEA programs currently operate in 10 states,
with New York having the most participants.  Vroman (1999) summa-
rized state SEA practices.
The reemployment bonus experiments have not yet been autho-
rized by any federal legislation.  However, as discussed in the first sec-
tion of this chapter, the Reemployment Act proposed by President
Clinton to Congress in 1994 recommended permitting states to estab-
lish reemployment bonus programs.  Three of the experiments—those
in Illinois, Pennsylvania, and Washington—are described in detail in
this book.  A fourth experiment conducted in New Jersey had a bonus
component, but it had design characteristics that made it unfeasible to
compare its results with those of the other three experiments.  We pro-
vide a summary description of the New Jersey experiment in the fol-
lowing section. 
The New Jersey Unemployment Insurance Reemployment 
Demonstration Project11
In 1986 and 1987, an experiment was conducted in New Jersey in
which almost 9,000 claimants were assigned to one of three treatment
groups, defined as follows:
• Treatment 1 (referred to as Job Search Assistance [JSA]): a set of
requirements and services that began with a notification letter
sent to each enrolled claimant after they received their first UI
payment, which occurred in about the third week after filing.  The
letter required the claimant to come to the ES office for services.
The services included orientation and testing in the fifth week,
followed a week later by a job-search workshop consisting of five
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half-day sessions, and then a one-on-one counseling/assessment
session, which usually occurred in the seventh week.  Of course,
employment or termination of benefit receipt could terminate the
sequence at any time.  There were periodic follow-up contacts 2,
4, 8, 12, and 16 weeks following assessment.
• Treatment 2: JSA plus training or relocation available after
assessment.  Those assigned to treatment 2 were told about the
availability of classroom and on-the-job training and encouraged
to pursue training.
• Treatment 3: JSA plus a reemployment bonus, which was offered
to claimants who were still unemployed after assessment.  The
bonus offer provided for one-half of the claimant’s remaining UI
entitlement at the time of assessment, declining after two weeks
at a rate of 10 percent of the original amount per week unit it was
no longer available.  To qualify, the claimant had to obtain a per-
manent, full-time job, not with a relative or the immediately pre-
ceding employer.  Sixty percent of the bonus was paid after 4
weeks of employment and the remainder if they remained
employed for 12 weeks.  The full bonus offer averaged $1,644,
and the overall average of the two bonus payments was close to
$1,300 for those who received payment.  
The eligible claimant population was restricted to workers who
were over 25 years of age and identified as being dislocated, which was
defined as having been employed by the same employer for three years
prior to filing and not being on standby or a member of a union that
places its workers through a hiring hall.  The demonstration sample of
11,060 UI beneficiaries was randomly selected from the population of
eligible UI beneficiaries filing in 10 of New Jersey’s 38 local UI
offices.  
All 8,675 participants assigned to one of the three treatments were
offered job-search assistance.  Of these, 77 percent attended the initial
orientation, 50 percent completed a job-search workshop, and 56 per-
cent attended an assessment/counseling interview.  About 15 percent of
the claimants who were offered training participated in training, most
of which was classroom training.  Nineteen percent of those offered the
bonus received at least the first payment, and 84 percent of this group
also received the second installment.  
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The JSA and training provided by the experimental treatments
were not unique in that these services were also available to nonpartic-
ipants in various forms, such as through the Job Training Partnership
Act (JTPA).  There were, however, significant differences in the
amount of such services received by participants and nonparticipants.
The most easily identifiable part of JSA is the job-search workshop.
Whereas almost half of claimants assigned treatment received the
workshop, only 7 percent of controls did (see U.S. Department of
Labor 1989, Table IV.II, p. 248).  The authors estimate that the 15 per-
cent attendance rate of training classes for participants in treatment 2
was about three to four times that of similar nonparticipants.  
There were strong effects of the treatments on UI outcomes,
namely benefits paid and weeks paid in the benefit year.12  Job-search
assistance was associated with an average decline in UI payments in
the benefit year of $87 and a decline in number of weeks of benefit
payments of almost 0.5 week.  The bonus offer was associated with an
additional decline of $83 in benefit payments in the benefit year and an
additional reduction of 0.5 week of benefit payments.  The training
offer had no effect on benefit payments in the benefit year, which may
not be surprising, since the initial impact must be to increase UI pay-
ments during the training period.  Any positive effects of training may
show up in the second year.    
Although the bonus offer treatment in the New Jersey experiment
had strong results, we do not believe that this experiment provided
much guidance for policy, because the particular bonus-offer treatment
was not replicable.  In the New Jersey experiment, bonus offers were
made only after seven weeks of insured unemployment, and the pend-
ing offer was unknown to the selected participants prior to that time.
Such a situation could not be replicated in a real program, as knowl-
edge of the pending offer would be available to all claimants from the
start of their benefit year (and probably prior to that, an issue that will
be explored further in Chapter 6).  This knowledge can be expected to
critically affect job-search behavior during the first seven weeks of the
benefit year, as well as during the period in which the bonus was avail-
able.
A more replicable bonus offer experiment, in which the experi-
mental subjects are informed of the bonus offer at the time they file for
UI benefits, thereby not contaminating the search process, was needed
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to provide guidance to policy in this area.  In fact, a bonus offer experi-
ment with this characteristic was undertaken by the Department of
Employment Security in Illinois.  The experiment in Illinois was to be
followed by similar experiments in Pennsylvania and Washington.  In
this book, we report on the Illinois, Pennsylvania, and Washington
experiments, because the designs of the three experiments were suffi-
ciently similar to make comparison of results among them, and com-
bining of data for simulations, feasible.  The New Jersey experiment
could not be used in this manner.  
BONUS OFFER EXPERIMENTS IN ILLINOIS, 
PENNSYLVANIA, AND WASHINGTON
Three bonus offer experiments conducted in Illinois in 1984–1985,
in Pennsylvania in 1988–1990, and in Washington in 1988–1989 pro-
vide evidence of the efficacy of a bonus offer program in UI.  These
three experiments are the subject of the remainder of this book.
In May 1984, the Illinois Department of Employment Security
contracted with the W.E. Upjohn Institute to conduct an experiment
with bonus offers in Illinois.  This experiment was funded by use of the
governor’s discretionary money under Title 7(b) of the Wagner-Peyser
Act, which allows states to use funds “for exemplary models for the
delivery of services.”  The initial interest of the state was in an experi-
ment involving an offer of a bonus to employers for hiring UI claim-
ants within a specified period of time.  A second experimental
treatment, called the Claimant Experiment, in which bonuses were
offered directly to unemployed claimants with the same proviso, was
added in order to compare the effects on unemployment of a labor
“supply” and a labor “demand” incentive.  Because of very low partici-
pation, the Employer Experiment had little effect on behavior, but the
Claimant Experiment was very successful in reducing UI benefit pay-
ments (see Chapter 4).  Its success, plus the encouraging results of the
New Jersey experiment, led the U. S. Department of Labor (more spe-
cifically, the Employment and Training Administration, Unemploy-
ment Insurance Service) to undertake two more bonus experiments,
with offers made to claimants.  
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In 1987, the Department of Labor selected Washington and later
that year selected Pennsylvania to be experimental states.  The Depart-
ment of Labor asked the W.E. Upjohn Institute to undertake the design
and evaluation of the Washington experiment, which became known as
the Washington Reemployment Bonus Demonstration13 (henceforth
referred to simply as the “Washington experiment”).  The Upjohn Insti-
tute obtained a matching grant from the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation to
fund the design and evaluation of the experiment.  Institute staff
worked with the Washington State Employment Security Department
to design the Washington experiment.
In 1988, the Department of Labor selected Mathematica Policy
Research, Inc., to design and evaluate the Pennsylvania Reemployment
Bonus Demonstration (referred to in this volume as the “Pennsylvania
experiment”).  Washington was to be a pure test of the bonus offer,
with several treatments providing a sufficient range of alternative
bonus offers to permit mapping of the feasible alternative policy
options.  Pennsylvania was similarly to provide a range of bonus offers,
some of which would also provide enhanced job-search assistance.  
As this book unfolds, it will become clear that the bonus offer
clearly reduced the weeks of benefit receipt and generally sped reem-
ployment of UI recipients into fully satisfactory jobs.  However, the net
benefit analysis is not as strong.  In general, the bonus offer appears to
be of positive net benefit to society as a whole, but the benefits are usu-
ally not positive for the UI system, meaning that only if money is trans-
ferred into the system to pay the bonuses is it a benefit to the UI
system.  Such transfer, however, is well within a feasible policy set and
may be undertaken for programs that are overall beneficial, even if not
to the implementing agency.  We believe, in addition, the results do
provide important information as to the existence of voluntary unem-
ployment by those receiving UI benefits.  Secondly, we believe that this
book provides important guidance to researchers and policymakers
alike who want to understand how to use field experiments to design or
improve social policy. 
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OVERVIEW OF THE BOOK
 Chapter 2 starts by formally presenting the four elements that
comprise an experimental design: 1) who will participate, 2) what are
the experimental treatments, 3) how many subjects will be in the exper-
iment and how will they be allocated, and 4) where will the experiment
take place and under what conditions.  The chapter next grapples with
the essential feature of any experiment, i.e., random assignment, dis-
cussing the process and its success in this case and looking at the char-
acteristics of the control populations across experiments.  The chapter
concludes with the description of experimental operations.  The bonus
experiments were unusually “clean” experiments in that they did not
suffer from selection bias, contamination of treatments, difficult opera-
tional environments, or inconsistent treatments.14
Chapter 3 describes the participants and rules of participation, and
it presents results on the rate of participation and the characteristics of
participants and nonparticipants.  In this chapter, the authors provide an
estimate of the extent to which UI claimants assigned to the experiment
failed to collect bonuses for which they appeared to be eligible.  A
large proportion of bonus money was “left on the table” so to speak,
and this has important implications for estimates of the cost and bene-
fits of a program that would be modeled after the experiments (dis-
cussed more fully in Chapters 6 and 7).
Chapter 4 presents the most critical results of the experiments,
namely, the effects directly on the UI system.  The impact of the exper-
iment on two variables—namely, the dollar value of UI benefits paid
out to claimants and the number of weeks (duration) of insured unem-
ployment—are estimated.  The chapter concentrates on the difference
between experimental and control parameters over the benefit year.
The results are presented utilizing different statistical methods, starting
with a simple comparison of means that, because of random assign-
ment, can provide unbiased estimates of the treatment impacts.  The
chapter then presents results that have been adjusted to account for
accidental differences in the characteristics of treatment and control
groups.  Results are also presented to show how the bonus offers affect
the timing of leaving unemployment and to show how the outcomes
respond to sequential increases in the amount of the bonus offer and
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the length of the qualification period.  Overall, the bonus offer tended
to reduce the length of insured unemployment, and there were differ-
ences in impacts by size of the bonus offer and length of the qualifica-
tion period. 
Chapter 5 proceeds to discuss some other important results, prima-
rily the impact of the treatments on the earnings of claimants, the
nature and quality of jobs, and employer attachment (i.e., did it affect
the tendency for UI claimants to return to their previous employer?).
Earning impacts are investigated by comparing the earnings in the year
starting with the quarter in which benefits are filed—thereby combin-
ing the direct impact of the offer on the timing of reemployment and
any differences in wage rates in the post-filing job that might be due to
the experimental treatment.  The latter is directly addressed by compar-
ing experimental and control differences in earnings after termination
of UI benefits.  The impact on the degree to which UI claimants
returned to the pre-filing employer was deemed important because of
employer concern that the bonus offer—not payable if the claimant is
recalled to the previous job—might loosen employer attachment.  No
support for this concern was found.  
Chapter 6 provides the bridge from experiment to program by dis-
cussing the various issues needed to translate experimental results into
programs.  It is both the most unique and in many ways most important
chapter in the book; it reflects the need to consider how a policymaker
is to make use of experimental results.  Experimental results are con-
fined to a subset of the total population who are exposed to the experi-
mental treatment, but they provide no estimate of the experimental
impact on subsets of persons in the total population who are not ex-
posed to the treatment.  In the case of the bonus experiment, all UI
claimants are in the exposed group, leaving all unemployed workers
who are not UI claimants outside of the experimental realm.  In a full
program, UI-eligible nonclaimants can enter the program realm by
claiming benefits, while those ineligible for benefits might be affected
by the program even if they do not participate in it.  Chapter 6 attempts
to measure these effects.  This chapter discusses, and attempts to quan-
tify, the effects of a bonus offer in a full program on the “entry effect”
(i.e., the tendency to increase filing for UI benefits) and on “displace-
ment” or crowding out (i.e., the tendency for participants to increase
job acquisition at the expense of nonparticipants).  The format and
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approach of Chapter 6, by necessity, differs from that of the proceeding
three chapters.  To measure entry and displacement effects in the econ-
omy at large, it is necessary to reach out to models of employment
equilibrium.  Thus, these results must be considered more speculative
than those that are derived directly from experimental results.  
Chapter 7 presents the results of a benefit-cost analysis that shows
the net benefits that can be potentially derived from a bonus offer pro-
gram from the perspective of society, government, the UI system, and
claimants.  Although recognizing that many benefits and costs cannot
be captured in this analysis, it is suggestive of the net benefits to be
derived from such a program from the perspective of different constitu-
ents.  In the last section of this chapter, we attempt to show the impact
on net benefits from the programmatic effects discussed in Chapter 6.
Basically, the low administrative costs make a bonus offer an appealing
program from society’s perspective.  Although only the high bonus
program generated net benefits from the government’s perspective, the
treatment simulations, using combined data from the three experi-
ments, demonstrated positive benefits from all three perspectives—
society, government, and the UI system—from a relatively small
($500) bonus.
Chapter 8 presents an overview of what we have learned and the
policy implications.  The expected effects of a bonus offer program on
work effort and the UI system are described, as is why an experimental
approach to answering the questions seems warranted.  The features of
the experiments and the essential findings are reviewed.  The average
effects of the treatments in each of the three experiments are summa-
rized in Table 8.1.  The summary demonstrates that the treatments sig-
nificantly reduced the number of claimants receiving benefits but that
the bonus offer program appears to have been cost-effective only in
Illinois.  In assessing the experiments, Professor Robins, the author of
this chapter, concludes that, from the standpoint of standards for social
policy research, the experiments were quite successful.  However, the
experiments were not successful in pinpointing statistically significant
differences across treatments, and Robins attempts to answer why this
is the case.  Most of the remainder of the chapter discusses alternative
policies that could be employed to accomplish the goals of a bonus
offer program to cost-effectively reduce insured unemployment.  Four
alternatives are discussed: earnings supplement, stricter sanctioning of
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work-search requirements, worker profiling, and Unemployment Insur-
ance Savings Accounts.
Notes
1. U.S. Department of Labor, Unemployment Insurance Financial Data, ET Hand-
book 394, 1948–1998, and U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics,
Labor Force Statistics from the Current Population Survey, 1948–1998.
2. U.S. Department of Labor, ET Handbook 394.
3. The replacement rate is the proportion of previous weekly earnings that is
replaced by UI benefits; specifically, it is the ratio of the weekly benefit amount to
the net pre-UI weekly wage.
4. Ehrenberg and Oaxaca (1976) estimated that a 10 percentage point rise in the UI
replacement rate (40 percent to 50 percent) would increase a male’s reemploy-
ment wage by 7.0 percent and a female’s wage by 1.5 percent.  Burgess and King-
ston (1976) and Holen (1977) found similar results.
5. The origins of job-search theory are found in the work of George Stigler (1961,
1962).
6. For evaluations of South Carolina, see Corson, Long, and Nicholson (1985); for
New Jersey, see Corson et al. (1989) and further discussion in the section below;
for Washington, see Johnson and Klepinger (1991, 1994).
7. The unemployment compensation amendments of 1993 (Public Law 103-153)
revised extended benefit rules and also required states to implement a system to
identify UI claimants most likely to need job-search assistance to avoid long-term
unemployment.  The system for identification became know as the Worker Profil-
ing and Reemployment Services system.
8. Later work-search demonstrations in Nevada and Minnesota (see Meyer [1995])
confirmed the positive effects of work-search requirements on duration of UI ben-
efits.
9. Different work-search requirements were developed for different groups of work-
ers, depending on their job prospects.  In addition, search requirements were
strengthened as the unemployment spell increased.
10. The NAFTA Implementation Act (Public Law 103-182) gave states the option of
continuing UI benefits for claimants who elect to start their own business.  Perma-
nent authorization was granted by federal legislation in 1998 for states to provide
self-employment assistance with UI trust fund money.
11. The design, operation, and evaluation of this experiment is described in detail by
Corson et al. (1989).
12. A goal of the experiment and its most likely outcome is a reduction in UI utiliza-
tion.  These also happen to be outcomes that are readily measured, since receipt of
unemployment benefits and weeks of benefits paid are data available directly from
the UI record system.  Thus, for the New Jersey experiment, as well as for the
three experiments that occupy most of this book, a principal measure of experi-
mental impact is the average difference in the dollars of benefits received and in
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the number of weeks benefits were paid between those assigned to bonus offer
treatments and those in the control group.
13. While Department of Labor refers to the Washington and Pennsylvania experi-
ments as “demonstrations,” we use the term “experiment” to make it clear that
random assignment to treatment and control groups was used to permit unbiased
estimates of program effects.  Demonstrations do not involve random assignment
and are most useful in testing workability of alternative administrative proce-
dures.
14. See Nathan (1988) for discussion of what makes good demonstration research.
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